Tuesday 31 March 2020

Coronavirus crisis raises huge questions over food security


The coronavirus crisis has raised huge doubts over food security – in the UK and many other countries. As this article points out:
Not since the Second World War has attention been so firmly focused on food. Before coronavirus we took a steady availability for granted. Now after coronavirus we’re wondering just how secure our food chain really is.
Clearly, as the article also makes clear, "We need our farmers... They are the people who will feed us." We will, as the FT says, need to produce more of our own food:


But will the UK get serious about growing its own food and protecting its own farmland – in the same way it did during wartime? Many hope so:

The last major food security emergency was, of course, during the Second World War; this resulted in the government-led ‘dig for victory’ campaign which combined growing your own fruit and vegetables with a nationwide mobilisation of farmers supported by the so-called ‘Land Girls’ to maintain secure and sustainable food supplies to the British people when the U-boats were sinking the North Atlantic convoys.
More than half of the UK's food is sourced from abroad. More than two-thirds of the land needed to produce the UK’s food and feed is based abroad. By the mid 2040s, the UK is predicted to have 77 million mouths to feed.

That's something to think about – not only in the face of climate change, but at a time when our country is struggling to feed itself due to a global pandemic. But it’s hardly surprising, given how much of our best and most versatile agricultural land – land like that at Straitgate Farm – has been lost to development over the years. More than 15,000 hectares of BMV land was estimated to have been lost to new development in England between 1998 and 2008 alone. Why?
interviews with local authority planners also highlight that the preservation of BMV land is generally ranked among the bottom two of a range of planning issues
That was 2010. Matters won't have improved since. The government claims there are policies that "aim to protect the best and most versatile (BMV) agricultural land and soils in England from significant, inappropriate or unsustainable development proposals" – which should of course protect Straitgate from the inappropriate, unsustainable development proposed by Aggregate Industries. But the revised NPPF only talks about recognising, not protecting, not safeguarding:
170. Planning policies and decisions should contribute to and enhance the natural and local environment by: ... b) recognising the intrinsic character and beauty of the countryside, and the wider benefits from natural capital and ecosystem services – including the economic and other benefits of the best and most versatile agricultural land, and of trees and woodland;
Back in 2012, we posted Why is DCC not allocating Straitgate Farm as a “Preferred Site” for food production? – rather than for sand and gravel extraction. We wrote:
They had their priorities right in 1968, and the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF) was one of the more vociferous objectors to the Straitgate development, saying "The Minister is anxious to safeguard such valuable agricultural land so far as possible and I am directed to advise that in his opinion there is the strongest possible objection to the proposed development on agricultural grounds.”
Things have changed since the 1950s and 60s. We have lost sight of where our food comes from, we have forgotten about food security, we are – according to a renowned professor of food policy – ‘in serious trouble’:
“...that 50% self-sufficiency should be nearer 80%. Not out of nationalism, but so we are in a position to contribute globally. We have a default position of assuming someone else will feed us.”

Perhaps the coronavirus crisis will be a wake-up call. Perhaps we will again realise the value of food production and the value of our best agricultural land. Perhaps the planning system will protect such land, assign it a more appropriate weighting in 'the planning balance'. Perhaps we will stop covering our food-producing land with concrete. Perhaps sustainable food production will – unlike today – become more valued than unsustainable mineral extraction.

Monday 30 March 2020

Coronavirus information from Devon County Council

Coronavirus means ‘business as usual’ for Aggregate Industries and LafargeHolcim

Despite these extraordinary times, it is apparently business as usual at Aggregate Industries:
...we maintain our commitment to offer the highest level of products and services to our customers and currently, our business is operating as usual.
Indeed, Aggregate Industries' hauliers are still going about their business:


Many have called for construction sites to close to stop the spread of the coronavirus. Some companies have already taken matters into their own hands – including rival Breedon:
In light of recent Government measures, and to ensure the safety and wellbeing of our colleagues, subcontractors, customers and communities, we have decided temporarily to suspend production at our UK sites, with the exception of our Hope cement plant and those of our operations which serve critical supply needs. During the course of this week we have begun gradually winding down the relevant sites, whilst ensuring that they are in a condition to be quickly and safely brought back online at the appropriate time.
It’s hasn't gone unnoticed that Aggregate Industries is putting business first:



This is a list of the construction work that is apparently critical; it does not include stockpiling aggregates or supplying materials for HS2.

... declined to comment on how many staff had contracted the disease. Most of its 2,000 plants globally were still operating fully, the company added.
In order to mitigate the financial impact of the situation, we have launched the action plan “HEALTH, COST & CASH” for immediate execution in all countries.
Due to the impact of the Coronavirus pandemic, the guidance for 2020 is no longer valid. While the implementation of the action plan “HEALTH, COST & CASH” is in full execution, the dynamic, volatile development of the Coronavirus pandemic makes it currently no longer possible to fully evaluate its impact on the performance of LafargeHolcim in 2020.
The Swiss company said it was trimming capital expenditure by at least 400 million Swiss francs ($416.5 million) compared to 2019 and reducing fixed costs by at least 300 million francs.
... cement companies in the northern hemisphere may see their busy summer months affected if the virus spreads. The effect on balance sheets may be visible with indebted companies and/or those with more exposure to affected areas disproportionately affected.

Monday 16 March 2020

Under the circumstances...

We will endeavour to keep this blog updated with issues relating to Aggregate Industries’ planning application for Straitgate Farm – mindful that over the coming months we will all have far more important things to deal with.

Thursday 5 March 2020

Wednesday 4 March 2020

Wetter winters in the UK are expected with climate change


There is NO allowance for this in Aggregate Industries’ guesstimate of the MWWT – the maximum water table – the base of any quarry, as we have posted.

Last month, we had Record breaking rainfall. Who knows where it will go from here?



Airports, roads, now HS2: the ‘net zero’ legal challenges are mounting

Another legal challenge has been mounted – this time against HS2 – based on a failure to take account of carbon emissions and climate change in light of the Paris Agreement and the Government’s pledge to achieve "net zero" carbon emissions by 2050.
A fresh legal challenge to HS2 has been launched by the naturalist and broadcaster Chris Packham, arguing that the UK government’s decision to approve the high-speed rail network failed to take account of its carbon emissions and climate impact.
The government has been served with a pre-action protocol letter challenging the decision:
The letter points out that the Oakervee report failed to take into account the full impact of HS2's potential carbon emissions impact. The initial environmental assessment for the project was published in 2013, before the government signed up to achieving "net zero" carbon emissions by 2050.
The government committed to base its decision of whether and how to proceed with HS2 on the output of a review that the public was assured would be rigorous and independent and would consider all the existing evidence and the full range of the costs of the project. Our client considers that the review has failed to meet those promised standards. He argues that the flawed process of the review means that environmental impacts relevant to the decision whether to proceed have not been properly assessed. In a time of unprecedented ecological catastrophe, he is clear that the law, and moral logic, require the government to think again.


Legal actions will not stop with HS2:


Of course, some people want to dig up our countryside, destroying ancient woodland and wildlife habitat:


Whereas others would rather see the back of it:


Long term trend in sales of sand and gravel in Devon continues to decline

Sales of sand and gravel in Devon declined by 10% in 2018, according to figures just released by Devon County Council – from 598,000 tonnes to 541,000 tonnes. Contrast this to the national situation where, according to the MPA, "total sales of land-won sand and gravel increased by 2.9% in 2018".


At the end of 2018, Devon's sand and gravel reserves (material already with permission to be extracted) stood at 4.885 million tonnes – a drop over 12 months that was greater than the level of sales, after Aggregate Industries "lost" some 700k tonnes or more – as we posted in AI has lost sand and gravel reserves AGAIN, this time at Hillhead.

The 4.885 million tonne figure provides a landbank of 9.7 years, based on the 10 year average sales figure of 504,000 tonnes. The Devon Minerals Plan runs a further 15 years until 2033. There could therefore be a potential shortfall of 2.7 million tonnes (15x0.504 - 4.885) at the end of this period.

Two sites have been allocated in the Plan to cover any shortfall: Straitgate is identified as having up to 1.2 million tonnes – if no unquarried buffer is maintained above the maximum water table to protect water supplies; Penslade is identified as having up to 8 million tonnes. Aggregate Industries owns both sites.

Whilst Devon has more than provided for its friends in the aggregates industry to cover any potential shortfall – and even now has nearly 10 years’ supply of sand and gravel at current rates – elsewhere, whilst preparing its mineral plan in 2018, Warwickshire admitted that "falling demand for sand and gravel means it needs to provide almost two million tonnes less than its original estimate."

Because estimates can be wrong. In 1967, Devon’s planning authority was forecasting annual sales of sand and gravel of "2.11 million tons" by the year 2000. Sales are now less than a quarter of that figure.



It is noteworthy that the 2018 sales figure is 23% less than the finger-in-the-air projection DCC made in the 6th LAA – as we addressed in Is DCC's LAA living in LAA LAA land? – the so-called housing trajectory scenario "to 'stress test' the capacity of Devon’s landbanks of land-won aggregates to cope with increased sales that mirror the predicted housing trajectory over the next ten years."

Monday 2 March 2020

LafargeHolcim makes ‘very strong progress’ on CO2 in 2019. True or greenwash?


For 2019 LafargeHolcim adopts an Integrated Financial Reporting approach which brings greater clarity on all our business issues and performance. In particular, we aim to provide you - besides our financial results - with an holistic information about our results and activities in the field of sustainability. The new report is intended to show you that sustainable business is a central component of our strategy and that the principles of sustainable action have a significant influence on our activities.

Given the "greater clarity on all our business issues", given the above claims on sustainability, given that LafargeHolcim has total CO2 emissions more than many countries, what does this new report tell us about the company’s largest negative impact – bearing in mind the urgent demands across the globe for action on climate change? On p44 we learn:
In 2019 our net CO2 scope 1 emissions (i.e., emissions directly under our control) decreased to 561 kilograms per ton of cementitious (kg CO2 /ton), or 1.4 percent lower than in 2018. Given this very strong progress we have revised our 2022 target to be more ambitious in the near term, from 560kg to 550kg, as we move toward our 2030 carbon targets of 520kg.*
Of course, it’s a moot point – as extreme weather grips our planet – whether 1.4% is very strong progress. But in reality, "the atmosphere doesn't care that we are using carbon more efficiently", it doesn't care about kg per tonne, it only cares about total CO2 emissions. So what are LafargeHolcim’s total emissions? Has "very strong progress" been made on that front too? On p143 we learn:
To keep up this momentum, the company has also revised its incentive scheme so that one-third of the Executive Committee’s performance share rewards is based on progress in carbon emissions, waste recycling and freshwater withdrawal.
Bravo. Let's get the incentives right, in case the global climate-related catastrophes we've already witnessed are not enough to focus minds. But what about total CO2 emissions? If very strong progress has been made with this number, wouldn’t LafargeHolcim be shouting it from the twittersphere, making as much greenwash capital as possible?

On p24 we learn that LafargeHolcim sold 208 million tonnes of cement in 2019, 0.5% up on a like-for-like basis compared with 2018, undoing some of that 1.4% reduction in kg of CO2 per tonne. On p47 we learn about 3 wind turbines forecast to avoid "9,000 tons of CO2 annually". Bravo again.

But what of total CO2 emissions? What about those millions of tonnes? On p103, investors learn about LafargeHolcim's "key operational risks" with respect to emissions and climate change:
The cement industry is associated with high CO2 intensity and LafargeHolcim is exposed to a variety of regulatory frameworks to reduce emissions, some of which may be under revision. These frameworks can affect the business activities of LafargeHolcim. In addition, a perception of the sector as a high emitter could impact our reputation, thus reducing our attractiveness to investors, employees and potential employees.
As the carbon debate intensifies, cement and concrete could be challenged by our customers as the building material of first choice because of perceived high embodied CO2. In the long term, should regulatory frameworks fail to incentivize consumption of low-carbon products, customers may be unwilling to pay for additional costs and the cement sector’s low-carbon roadmap might be compromised.
What is LafargeHolcim to do? One short-term action is to:
Integrate CO2 in management (e.g. include cost in production to incentivize change management and include CO2 impact in all M&A and CAPEX decisions);
Bravo. We’ll see what happens in East Devon. But what about total CO2 emissions?

In all 280 pages of this new integrated report there is not one mention of the total CO2 emissions emitted by the company. LafargeHolcim is clearly in no hurry for you to find out about some numbers.

Last year, in its 2018 Sustainability Report, LafargeHolcim reported total emissions as:


Massive numbers, but clear for all to see. For 2019 – despite claims of "greater clarity on all our business issues" – you will need to dig deep into another report, a far less glossy report, to find the same information, information buried in the small print:


Fortunately, these figures – highlighted in red by us – are indeed lower than 2018, in total 0.7% lower on a like-for-like basis (bearing in mind LafargeHolcim sold its operations in Indonesia and Malaysia in 2019). Unfortunately, however – and whatever the claimed reductions in kg of CO2 per tonne – total emissions are still 2% higher than 2017.

LafargeHolcim would rather these numbers were not broadcast – judging by where they are hidden. The company seems to have become more shy about the scale of its total emissions. It would rather talk about CO2 in terms of kilograms per ton. It would rather the world didn’t know that LafargeHolcim’s cost to society in 2019 alone was:

148,000,000 tonnes of CO2

LafargeHolcim would rather you looked at the sort of graph you’ll find on p45: a graph of kilograms per ton, a graph with a scale that starts at 400. If we redraw that graph with a scale starting at zero, we can then decide if "very strong progress" is being made, will ever be made, can ever be made – given that cement is produced by heating limestone to around 1000°C, given that 50% of the CO2 released is from the chemical process, 40% from burning fuel, 10% from mining and transporting raw materials:


There's no getting away from it. LafargeHolcim – the world's largest cement producer, and parent company to Aggregate Industries – is effecting change at a glacial pace. It is not going to save us from our climate emergency – however many wind turbines may appear on its tweets. We need to use less cement. We need to use less concrete. In just the last 3 years, on a like-for-like basis, LafargeHolcim has pumped out nearly 450 million tonnes of CO2.



*Note: There’s nothing in LafargeHolcim's new integrated report to say so, or why it's changed, but when the company says "ton" it doesn’t mean a US ton, it means a metric ton or – as the company used in previous reports – tonne. Confusing? Of course.

Cadhay’s planning lawyer makes another representation

Grade I listed Cadhay derives all its water from the Straitgate aquifer – for scores of people in various properties, for a busy tea room, for livestock, for wetland habitats in ancient woodland, for listed mediaeval fishponds. No wonder there’s concern – in the face of Professor Brassington’s report – that Aggregate Industries' plans for Straitgate Farm will harm the local water environment.


Canadian tar sands plan collapses

Yet another sign that across the world times are getting tougher for carbon-intensive projects:

A major effort to expand development of Canada’s oil sands has collapsed shortly before a deadline for government approval, undone by investor concerns over oil’s future and the political fault lines between economic and environmental priorities.
Simon Dyer, from the Pembina Institute, a leading Canadian environmental research organization, said:
Companies like Teck are realizing that global capital markets are changing rapidly. There was never an economic pathway for this project under global demand scenarios consistent with the Paris climate agreement.