Thursday, 16 January 2020

Alternative water supplies: EA’s remit is ‘objectives and outcomes, not solutions’

Not many days have passed since the Environment Agency said it had finished responding to Joe Public about Aggregate Industries’ plans to quarry Straitgate Farm:
...we will not be providing further responses over-and-above the information contained within this position statement.
But what do we find? This week, out of the blue, seemingly unprompted, the EA has responded again. Perhaps people at the EA had time to reflect about Straitgate over the Christmas break, time to think about alternative water supplies and how they might be provided – to people, to farms, to mediaeval fishponds, to wetland habitats in ancient woodlands – should the whole thing go belly up, time to think that they don’t want that responsibility on their shoulders thank you very much.

We have in the past questioned how alternative supplies might be provided. There’s no point having a legal agreement to provide alternative drinking water supplies – if you have no idea how those supplies might be provided, how fast they could be provided, or even whether indeed they could. Recently, we have posted AI’s water consultants are still confused about Cadhay’s mediaeval fishponds –
 but now have ‘no objection’ to including them in a Section 106. We have also posted about AI’s legal assurances for alternative water supplies “unfit for purpose” and about AI breaking S106 water monitoring agreements.

In its reply to Professor Brassington’s letter in December, the EA provided a position statement. There was no attempt to explain why the EA disagreed with the eminent hydrogeologist, who says:
It is my view that this application should be turned down and that no quarrying be permitted as to allow it will threaten these water resources for many years to come.
This week, in an email to solicitors representing the owner of Cadhay, the EA wrote:
[Further to our last email] which was sent following our careful consideration of the information supplied by you and Professor Brassington, I am writing to provide some information which was omitted from our email. The below wording should have accompanied our position statement…
You asked in your email of 15 November 2019 about ‘workable proposals’ for provision of alternative supplies. We reviewed the applicant’s draft Section 106 agreement and provided a response to Devon County Council. We see our role in the Section 106 review as giving comments on objectives and outcomes, rather than recommending specific solutions now that may not be appropriate or practical in the future. Devon County Council are responsible for ensuring that the Section 106 is enforceable and contains the appropriate level of detail.
Whether the EA really did give information supplied by Prof Brassington "careful consideration", readers will have to decide. Plainly, if the EA "omitted" important information, the feeling might be they didn't.

In fairness, for all that careful consideration, the EA wasn’t actually asked to come up with their solutions – because that’s the job of Aggregate Industries. What was asked for was merely "sight of workable proposals", any workable proposals; because none have been forthcoming so far.

But clearly, the EA wants to stress – and read into that what you will – that responsibility for these mythical workable proposals for alternative water supplies, for all the above-named receptors, should fall upon DCC's shoulders. It even looks like the EA itself doesn’t know how replacement water supplies would be provided – if it prefers to talk about "objectives and outcomes" not "solutions".

Unfortunately, objectives and outcomes won’t cut it with local people whose drinking water supply has been lost or contaminated; they will be looking for solutions – and quickly. We saw how successful the EA was with objectives in Dawlish.

Devon County Council will have to assure itself that alternative water supplies would work – would immediately work – or local people and businesses could be left without drinking water, and the Council involved in expensive litigation. It’s no good pointing to "objectives and outcomes" from the EA, it’s no good saying "the EA’s happy, so we’re happy". DCC will need to know that mitigation would work in the real world – the one where people and farms are miles from a mains water supply, the one where mediaeval fishponds are central to the setting of a Grade I Tudor manor house.

Photo: Matt Austin

Even if it could be decided quickly who is at fault – and no doubt Aggregate Industries would engage legions of lawyers and experts to prove, as they invariably do in the construction industry, it's not our fault, gov! – there is, as posted here, the small matter of:
* where are the alternative water supplies;
* how reliable are those supplies;
* what is the quality of the water from those supplies;
* how quickly can sufficient supplies be made available; and
* what rights does the applicant have to secure those supplies?
The same planning lawyer who pointed that out also stressed:
As the Council will be aware, as a matter of law the ES is required to properly set out the mitigation measures proposed to address any significant adverse impacts likely to be caused by the development, following which the local planning authority can then assess those mitigation measures. In other words, if there’s a problem which might be caused by the development, the LPA must know how that problem will be mitigated, and then assess such mitigation.
In relation to the security of water supplies, the applicant has not provided any details of the proposed mitigation measures in the event that the supplies are disrupted: the proposed planning obligations are bereft of any such details. Without having details of the proposed mitigation, the Council cannot properly assess the environmental impact of the scheme.
To underline the EA's new attitude to Straitgate – its attitude to hearing from Professors of Hydrogeology, its attitude to bearing any responsibility for real-world solutions – this week's email finishes:
If you have further concerns regarding the Straitgate planning application, these should be directed to Devon County Council...
Which says it all.

Quarry activists to petition EU over threat to drinking water supplies


Unfortunately no longer an option for us – but an interesting story all the same.
Cork County Council granted permission to construction company Roadstone to open the quarry two years ago – but activists appealed it to An Bord Pleanála, who then granted them an oral hearing.
Weeks out from that hearing on 1 October this year, Roadstone, withdrew its application for the quarry.
Locals are concerned that if this aquifer is disturbed, their water supply would be threatened, and so are taking a citizens’ petition to Europe.
Locals fear this company, or another one, will try again in the future. They are joining forces with others across Ireland in an effort to push for better regulation of quarries.

AI’s target start date for Straitgate is 2021 – apparently


The delay is not surprising. Last year, a ROMP application DCC/3655/2014 for Hillhead let the cat out of the bag that Aggregate Industries didn't 'need' Straitgate Farm until 2021:
Should Straitgate Farm obtain planning permission in 2018, extraction would likely commence in 2021.
We posted at the time So, Straitgate’s not ‘needed’ until 2021 – says AI – which proves it’s not needed at all. Previously Aggregate Industries had proclaimed it couldn't do without Straitgate Farm because the remaining reserve at Hillhead was just too sandy, but for 5 years the company has happily disproved this assertion – evidenced by huge stockpiles of gravel.

But there is now confirmation within documents from the the company's application for Straitgate Farm – the Transport Assessment released under a recent FOI request – that Aggregate Industries' timescales for this site have indeed slipped:
5.1.1 Sand and gravel extraction at Straitgate Farm is proposed to be conducted on a campaign basis over an estimated 10 to 12 year period. On this basis the assessment covers the period between 2021 to 2033. Campaign periods are envisaged to last between five and seven weeks and secure 60,000 tonnes of mineral for transportation to Hillhead Quarry for processing. Subject to market conditions between two and three campaigns are proposed each year resulting in a period of working between 10 and 21 weeks of the year.
Aggregate Industries' application for Straitgate Farm was first launched in 2015, to provide for when operations ceased at Venn Ottery at the end of 2016.

Local people repeatedly ask about Devon County Council's attitude to these continued delays. Back in March 2018, we were informed by a planning officer:
There is no specific policy as far as I'm aware. Some applications take longer than others to determine. If there was complete inactivity we might ask for it to be withdrawn, but as this is an allocated mineral site and we have formally asked for additional information from the applicants we are giving them the opportunity to provide this. I imagine that you would expect the applicant to response to issues that have come up in the course of the determination of this application and at the moment this is what they are endeavouring to do.
That was almost two years ago.

To give some idea of how long planning applications for quarries typically take, the MPA recently published its seventh AMPS report:
It takes 29.4 and 29.9 months respectively to secure permission for both sand and gravel and crushed rock reserves, based on a 10-year average.
As the Council's planning officer made clear, some applications will indeed take longer than others, longer than that 10-year average figure, and likewise, some will be determined sooner. To the end of last year, the clock on Straitgate had been running for 54 months – almost twice as long as the average.

Straitgate, if permitted, would be considered a small quarry – hardly viable. Goodness knows how long Aggregate Industries might take for a normal size quarry.

Plastic kerbs


Cumbria County Council has been using plastic kerbs for more than 10 years. Other local authorities are now set to follow, with trials taking place in Hampshire and Wokingham.

Durakerb use a polymer blend containing 88% recycled material. Each kerb contains the equivalent of 182 recycled plastic bottles and weighs just 6kg. It is claimed that each kerb saves around 30kg of CO2, and is also "lighter than stone or concrete, therefore easier to handle, and does not generate harmful crystalline silica dust when cut."
Councillor Rob Humby, Hampshire County Council’s executive member for environment and transport, supports the trial. He said: "We’re committed to clear action, embedding carbon reduction measures in services across the county council. This innovative use of recycled plastic kerbing, which is durable but much lighter than the concrete equivalent, results in 40% less carbon during manufacture."
Wokingham borough councillor Cllr Pauline Jorgensen, executive member for highways and transport, said: "We are looking for ways to make our services greener and this solution allows us to find an effective use of recycled materials while carrying out important highway maintenance across our network." "Exploring further use of recycled products like these kerbstones are the type of changes we are looking into as we aim to be a carbon neutral borough by 2030," added Cllr Gregor Murray, executive member for climate emergency.


Bricks from waste



How do you turn poo into aggregate? No, it's not the start of a joke, but the subject of a BBC article last year about Thames Water's efforts to produce 2 million carbon-negative construction blocks a year. This is another example of the rise of manufactured secondary aggregates, reducing the need to dig up irreplaceable natural resources:
A flush deal signed this week could see Londoners’ waste used for building new homes. In a breakthrough development, Thames Water has found an inventive way to use sewage – which already generates renewable power – to help create a material for carbon negative heavy-duty bricks.
Every day, the waste of four million Londoners entering Europe’s largest sewage works in Beckton is drained of water, with the leftover solids roasted in the company’s waste-to-energy incinerator. The high temperatures sanitise the waste and release heat for producing electricity on site. The leftover ash has – until now – been binned.
The latest innovation announced today will see this dried residue ash reacted with carbon dioxide, water, sand and a small quantity of cement to form aggregate for individual breeze blocks – each weighing 17kg. Thames Water’s supply deal is expected to produce 18,000 tonnes of aggregate every year, enough for around 2.3 million construction blocks to be used in a range of property and business developments across the capital and beyond.
Using ash to produce synthetic aggregate locks in around 800 tonnes of CO2 and will replace 18,000 tonnes of natural resources being dug out of the ground annually – contributing to the UK’s circular economy. In addition, the synthetic aggregate is carbon beneficial as more CO2 is captured than is generated in the manufacturing process.
Another type of brick made from waste material was announced last week. The world’s first building brick made with 90% recycled content – using construction and demolition waste and no cement – has gone into production in Scotland. Developed at Heriot-Watt University,
The K-Briq is said to produce just 10% of the CO2 emissions of a traditional fired brick, uses less than a tenth of the energy in its manufacture and can be made in any colour.

Aggregate Industries ‘used to be great!’

Glassdoor is a website where current and former employees anonymously review companies. Here's how one company currently fares, and, below, an example of just one of those anonymous reviews.


DCC approves Rockbeare application

We have previously posted about this planning application, DCC/4132/2019, most recently here. The application sought "to continue importation of inert soils and subsoil to allow for revised restoration contours at Marshbroadmoor including a revised restoration scheme at Rockbeare Quarry", and proposed "a reduction in end date for the restoration of the Rockbeare site to the 31 December 2028".

On 23 December 2019, Devon County Council approved the application with conditions – including on airport safeguarding.

The officer’s report reminds us that "Rockbeare Quarry has been the subject of a number of planning permissions to work sand and gravel dating from a 1947 IDO permission."

Aggregate Industries' consultants have previously been at pains to remind us, including in documents to support the application:
The effects associated with the operational development will generally be considered to be temporary in nature, mineral development and restoration representing a temporary use of the land.
Which may be so, but 1947 to 2028 is for many people a lifetime. If restoration brings any benefits, don't expect to be alive to see them.

Another example of that temporary use of the land can be seen at Pinhoe Quarry where:
Exeter City Council’s planning committee backed officer recommendations to approve the details of 380 new homes
Outline consent had been granted in 2012, and extensive earthworks followed. By last year:
It is hoped the first homes will be ready to move into during December 2020 with the whole development expected to take around eight years to complete.
Clay extraction for the use of brick making is recorded as taking place at the site since 1905, with planning permissions for Pinhoe Quarry granted in 1947 and 1969... The clay extracted from the site was used in the production of bricks at the works opposite the quarry. Both the brickworks and quarry operations ceased in 2006.

Tuesday, 14 January 2020

After DCC’s climate emergency declaration – and “comments in the public domain about how the road trips can be justified” – Council pushes AI for further information

As we watch our planet burn, we know, according to analysis in the Financial Times, that if every company acted like LafargeHolcim – parent company of Aggregate Industries – we would be heading for a +6°C world, enough to "wipe out most life on the planet".



Apparently, the climate emergency is top of the agenda @DevonCC:


Chief Executive Phil Norrey told members of Devon County Council’s ruling Cabinet on 12 June 2019:
This is not about gestures, this is about action
If it’s not about gestures, how has the Council's declaration of a climate emergency affected its actions on planning decisions? One recent decision taken was the approval of planning application DCC/4135/2019. We posted about the application, which proposed:
Change of use from In-Vessel Composting Facility to Incinerator Bottom Ash (IBA) Recycling Facility to import and process up to 90,000 tonnes of IBA per annum, Former TEG In Vessel Composting Site, Stuart Way, Hill Barton Business Park, Exeter
The officer’s report put before the Development Management Committee did indeed look at the impact the proposal would have on climate change, making the case it would lead to reduced CO2 emissions:
Other Environmental Considerations (Including Climate Change)
6.29. Paragraph 148 of the National Planning Policy Framework requires that “the planning system should support the transition to a low carbon future in a changing climate”, while Devon County Council has declared a climate emergency and committed to facilitating the reduction of Devon’s carbon emissions to net-zero by 2050. The scope for individual planning applications to contribute to these initiatives will be dependent on the nature and scale of the development being proposed, and relevant considerations are outlined below.
6.31. Given these requirements, the application would also allow the IBA to be managed and utilised closer to the source of the waste. It is understood that alternative locations closer to the Plymouth energy from waste facility have been considered but have proved undeliverable. Whilst HGVs will still be required to transport material between the facilities, this is a much shorter distance than the current arrangements which see the IBA from Plymouth shipped to the Netherlands. The applicant has provided a comparison of the estimated CO2 emissions generated from the transportation to the Netherlands and Hill Barton and this shows that shipping the material to the Netherlands generates approximately 3.5 times as much CO2 as the road transportation to Hill Barton. This assessment is considered reasonable and would lead to reduction in CO2 emissions.
So, as we watch our planet burn, what additional information – on carbon emissions, alternatives etc – would be made available to the planning committee that decides on Aggregate Industries' proposal to quarry Straitgate Farm and then haul each 29 tonne load of as-dug material a round trip of 46 miles for processing, 2.5 million miles in all, to a location that already has millions of tonnes of sand and gravel reserves and resource?

Documents released under a recent Freedom of Information request show that, on 29 May 2019, Devon County Council wrote to Aggregate Industries:
Following the County Council’s declaration of a climate emergency, we have been asked to do more in our committee reports to consider this issue in finer detail.
This is the current requirement:
“I have been advised by Democratic Services that we need to include ‘Climate Change Impact’ in Cabinet/Committee reports (This was mentioned by Councillor Croad at yesterday’s Council meeting). Democratic Services have issued revised guidance as follows on a required paragraph. Please could you remember this when drafting/approving reports.
Environmental Impact Considerations (Including Climate Change)
Summary of all environment and environmental related issues (including climate change impact) including not only any direct impact on the environment and mitigating activity/work, but the socio-economic impact and sustainability of any proposals ... the likely impact on carbon emissions (or offsetting) ... referring to any formal Environmental Impact Assessment or options appraisal undertaken.
Describe the effects .... are they positive, negative or neutral ... factually! It does not necessarily need to be a balancing exercise between the extremes. Major schemes should detail the economic impact/benefits.”
Clearly this is up to the case officer, but if you are able to provide me with more up to date information about alternatives and with any up to date economic data that would be really helpful. You will understand that this report will be subject to heavy scrutiny and that there are already comments in the public domain about how the road trips can be justified when there are alternative reserves available closer to the process plant.
On 25 September 2019, Devon County Council wrote to Aggregate Industries again:
…I would however welcome a statement of where AI is with the remainder of the requests for additional environmental information, and in particularly the revised sustainability appraisal I recommended you to provide following the DCC declaration of a climate emergency.
On 7 January 2020, in an email to us from Devon County Council’s FOI team:
3. The revised sustainability appraisal has not been received as yet, therefore we do not hold this information. The Planning service recommendation was made following the Council’s declaration of a climate emergency.
No doubt Aggregate Industries will eventually come up with some cock and bull story – as before. But as we posted in AI’s sustainability argument for Straitgate blown away with PSV mileage calculations and AI’s resurrected plant at Hillhead has enough material nearby to take it beyond 2050:
...each 28.5 tonne load of high PSV material from Straitgate would necessitate a staggeringly unsustainable 417 miles of transportation for production, BEFORE any onward delivery. In other words, high PSV material from Straitgate would have to travel over 3x the return-trip distance of material from Greystone, an AI quarry in Cornwall also with high PSV material.
But seemingly, Aggregate Industries doesn't care about CO2 emissions. As we posted last year, Climate emergency? Not at Aggregate Industries. CO2 emissions increase again.




Thursday, 9 January 2020

Another day, another accident on the B3174 Exeter Road


This was the scene on the B3174 Exeter Road this morning – with power outages in the area. Yet another accident. Yet further confirmation of the dangers of this road, and its unsuitability for Aggregate Industries' plans for up to 216 HGV movements a day.

The accident occurred in the very same location proposed for the cattle crossing that would result from Aggregate Industries’ plans – as the Straitgate dairy operation would be forced to seek replacement pasture on the south side of the road.

It was only in November that we pointed to Another accident on B3174 Exeter Road, we pointed to the almost accident-free picture painted by Aggregate Industries’ traffic consultants, we pointed to the numerous other accidents that have come to our attention over just the last 3 years.

Breedon acquires CEMEX operations & assets in UK

As Aggregate Industries messes around with sites like Straitgate, other companies – run by ex-Aggregate Industries' people – have bigger things on their mind:


Breedon are buying a £178m slice of CEMEX:
Breedon is taking over 49 ready-mix plants, 28 aggregate quarries, four depots, one cement terminal, 14 asphalt plants and four concrete products operations. Parts of Cemex’s Paving Solutions business in the UK are also included in the sale to Breedon.
Breedon is taking over approximately 100 Cemex UK operations across six divisions in Scotland, Wales, northeast England, Norfolk, the East Midlands, and Yorkshire.
The acquisitions will increase Breedon’s mineral reserves and resources by approximately 170 million tonnes – or enough to last more than 27 years at current extraction rates.
In 2018 the Cemex UK’s assets being acquired generated revenue of £178m and EBITDA of £23m.
Pat Ward, Breedon's Group Chief Executive, previously CEO of Aggregate Industries, commented:
This is a unique opportunity to extend our national network through a single value-enhancing transaction, substantially increasing our footprint in several regions of Great Britain where we are currently underrepresented and adding approximately 170 million tonnes of mineral reserves and resources.
It’s another indication of the going rate for mineral reserves and resources. In 2018, we asked What’s Straitgate Farm worth to AI?

Sirius Minerals

Sirius Minerals – the UK’s largest mining project, and subject of various posts on this blog – has recently suffered funding problems, and now finds itself on the receiving end of a takeover bid:


Wednesday, 8 January 2020

EA ‘will not be providing further responses’ – but now accepts base of any quarry at Straitgate will have to be raised again, this time to reflect 1990 groundwater levels

Professor of Hydrogeology, Rick Brassington, recent winner of the Geological Society's Whitaker Medal, has sent three substantive responses to the Environment Agency – all objecting to Aggregate Industries’ plans to quarry Straitgate Farm. We have posted about them here, here and here. His latest response warns:
It is my view that this application should be turned down and that no quarrying be permitted as to allow it will threaten these water resources for many years to come.
It is clear however that the Environment Agency has had enough. Haven’t we all? At the end of last year, in its reply to Prof Brassington’s latest response, the EA set out its position:
We have concluded that the applicant has undertaken appropriate risk assessment and proposed appropriate mitigation measures to protect water resources. We therefore do not have any objections to this planning proposal. We have provided SAG and other stakeholders the opportunity to give their views on our advice to DCC. Where appropriate we have incorporated their views and requested additional information from the applicant. Whilst we are happy to continue to receive additional information from stakeholders, we will not be providing further responses over-and-above the information contained within this position statement.
So there. No attempt to explain why the EA disagrees with Prof Brassington, and clearly little thanks to stakeholders for all their help. But plainly the EA is tired of hearing about Straitgate Farm and tired of modifying its conditions based on new information fed to them by stakeholders; information that has not been supplied by the applicants, information they had not uncovered for themselves.

But whilst the EA may be tired of Straitgate, and may not be providing any further responses, only last month it was forced to recommend yet another change to Aggregate Industries' plans.

Readers may remember that in June 2018, we posted AI has ‘forgotten’ one 1990 borehole – that puts groundwater 2.8M ABOVE MWWT, 2.8m above the base of a quarry that was proposed to be worked dry. Previously, the EA had dismissed data from this borehole. In an email to us in July 2018:
The data you highlight in your email of 12 June 2018 is one ‘spot reading’ of groundwater level from 1990. As such, it is difficult to judge its significance.
A year later, the EA provided exactly the same response to Prof Brassington’s report:
We note the groundwater level reading from 1990. However, because this is just one spot reading it is difficult to judge its significance.
Aggregate Industries’ consultants agreed with the EA. In September, Wood wrote a letter responding to Prof Brassington and was adamant this measurement should have no significance. This despite this measurement being undertaken by ECC Quarries (Aggregate Industries’ predecessor), and despite this and other measurements forming part of a report used to support the site’s inclusion in the Devon Minerals Plan. Previously, Aggregate Industries’ consultants had argued "A comprehensive review of the geology across the site was undertaken in 1990… to confirm the local geological characteristics and groundwater levels". These same consultants have now changed their tune, being at pains to argue that "the reliability of this record is, at best, questionable":
The isolated (in time) water level measurement recorded at SG1990/021 cannot be considered reliable because there is insufficient context provided regarding the circumstances under which it was recorded.
Wood’s arguments dismissing the water level reading recorded in borehole SG1990/021 have been shown to be untrue.
I am surprised that the Environment Agency has accepted that this water level should be ignored particularly in the absence of any contradictory evidence.
Based on further information received from SAG we recommended to Devon County Council that the applicant updates the Maximum Winter Water Table grid with groundwater levels recorded at the site in 1990.
Why is this important? As we previously posted, the measurement in question showed groundwater 2.8m higher than the base of the proposed quarry, 2.8m higher than the MWWT – Aggregate Industries’ prediction of the maximum winter water table – the surface its consultants had merrily claimed:
Monitoring over the exceptionally wet winters of 2013 and 2014 allow this surface to be defined with confidence. 6.2.2
The groundwater level recorded in 1990 should now be used to create a new interpolated surface of the maximum water table. 

Given that water was recorded at 1.26m below ground level, there will be no recoverable resource in the area surrounding this location.

As we’ve posted below, Aggregate Industries was asked to provide a level of accuracy, "a description of tolerance levels", for the MWWT. The company’s consultants were reluctant to provide an answer, but eventually claimed the MWWT was "based on the higher of the two interpolated surfaces", that the MWWT was the "upper limit of interpretation". They claimed the difference between those two surfaces provided a "reflection of the ‘tolerance’". The claim is nonsense.

If proof were needed, the 1990 figure shows that the interpolated surface, the claimed "upper limit of interpretation", is inaccurate in one location to the tune of 2.8m. There are four other locations where it has become apparent that the MWWT model has been guesstimated wrongly. Across some 55 acres, there are likely to be other areas. As Dr Rutter made clear, the MWWT:
is only a model of reality, and may not represent actual groundwater levels across the site.
The steep hydraulic gradient combined with limited monitoring, in my opinion, is likely to result in errors in the actual depth to maximum groundwater across the site.

It all underlines the need for a tolerance, a safeguard, a margin of error, to be built into the MWWT across the whole site. The 2.8m figure gives an indication of the scale of safeguard needed. Many quarries leave 1m unquarried above groundwater levels for this very reason. Aggregate Industries is trying to be clever, trying to be greedy.

The company claims, by only working the mineral when groundwater levels recede during the summer and autumn months, there will always be at least 1m between where extraction is taking place and groundwater levels. The EA conditions:
Continuous monitoring of all site piezometers (and interpolation between them) shall be used to ensure, during working, that the base level to which the quarry is worked is no closer to the contemporaneous groundwater level than 1m.
If the base of proposed extraction is inaccurate by as much as 2.8m, this condition is plainly insufficient.

Remember: Aggregate Industries is proposing to leave a 0m unquarried safeguard above the MWWT to protect surrounding drinking water sources, surrounding farms, wetland habitats in ancient woodlands and mediaeval fishponds. The 1990 figure was recorded in the middle of June, when groundwater levels would have already declined significantly from their spring maximums. The 1990 figure was recorded in the same location where AI has proposed infiltration areas to control flooding, an area where there is clearly insufficient depth of material to perform such a task.

A new MWWT prediction should now be produced using all of the available maximum data – the 1990 level, plus the four levels that exceeded the MWWT in 2018 – in exactly the same way it would have been produced originally, had these values been available then. In addition, a tolerance level, a margin of error, should be built in, particularly in areas distant from piezometers.

The MWWT should not be a fudged. There should not be some trivial finger-in-the-air localised adjustments, not some trivial lifting of contours, not some fiddle as there has been in this document – where changes to the MWWT to reflect the higher 2018 figures are not based on interpolation between other site piezometers, but rather an opinion from Aggregate Industries' consultants:
In the specialist opinion of Wood E&IS, the revised contours represent a realistic assessment of the change in MWWT arising from the readings in April 2018.
The problem is, this so-called specialist opinion has been found lacking at every turn. This specialist opinion has no rational basis for tweaking the MWWT as they have – other than to recover the maximum resource for their paymasters. The higher figures now available should be used to reinterpret the whole surface, the whole of the proposed quarry base, as indeed the EA’s condition – "interpolation between them" – calls for.

Tuesday, 7 January 2020

AI still won’t come clean on accuracy of MWWT – the base of any quarry at Straitgate

The MWWT – the maximum winter water table – would be the base elevation of any quarry at Straitgate Farm. It is a model, a prediction of what might be happening across some 55 acres, based on water levels recorded in just 6 piezometers. The accuracy of this prediction would matter less if Aggregate Industries were planning to leave a safety margin, an unquarried buffer, above this surface – but it is not.

The MWWT for this site has been defined by using a computer model as the number of piezometers (six) are insufficient to cover the quarry area in sufficient detail. Computer models of groundwater systems are good at showing changes in groundwater levels although they are poor at showing the actual amount of such changes. As a result, the computer model derived MWWT surface is unlikely to provide an accurate representation of the real maximum groundwater levels...
I am concerned that there is a very steep hydraulic gradient across the site, from around 152m in the west to less than 135 m in the east, and the limited number of piezometers used to grid the water table surface. Variations in the shape of the water table cannot be contoured based on the number of piezometers used in the application... The steep hydraulic gradient combined with limited monitoring, in my opinion, is likely to result in errors in the actual depth to maximum groundwater across the site.
Even Aggregate Industries’ own consultants – before they whitewashed their reports – warned:
It should be recognised that a variety of possible grid generation algorithms and parameters exist for discrete point data and that each of these can be supplemented to varying degrees by supporting interpretative data and conceptual understanding. The two grids therefore represent just two of many possible interpretations of the data which themselves are based on an incomplete parameterisation of the detailed groundwater dynamics of the Site.
Nevertheless, it has been a struggle to get Aggregate Industries to say anything on the accuracy – or inaccuracy – of its prediction of maximum groundwater levels at Straitgate. The company has continually refused to provide an answer. What could it want to hide? In 2016, we asked Devon County Council:
Since AI now intends to dig right down to the maximum water table, perhaps you could ask Amec to confirm the specific level of accuracy (in +/- m) to which their maximum groundwater contours are mapped?
Aggregate Industries was asked. Silence. In October 2017, the Environment Agency tried again:
Whilst our position remains unchanged from that which we set out in our letter of 01 September 2017 we agreed with the Straitgate Action Group that further information should be requested from the applicant... In particular we agreed that the following information should be requested: ... • A description of the tolerance levels and interpolation method used to produce the ‘Maximum Winter Water Table’ grid;
Again, as we posted at the time, on the matter of tolerances – silence. In November 2017, we wrote to the EA, pointing out that:
Amec have now responded to your letter of 9 October, but unfortunately they still fail to address a number of the fundamental concerns we raised. Your letter specifically asked for "A description of the tolerance levels...". This has not been provided.
Amec say "Four alternative grid interpolation methods were selected... Each of these methods represents an exact interpolator". In this case, all "exact" means is that the derived MWWT surface passes through each of the six maximum recorded points. It does not mean that the interpolation surface is exact anywhere else across the site. In fact, given that two of the interpolation methods were found not to be suitable, and that for the one chosen, Radial Basis Function, "There are five different basis functions... Each basis function has a different shape and results in a different interpolation surface" there is obviously a very high chance that the MWWT surface provided by AI does not reflect reality.
As you are well aware, this would matter less if any quarrying went down no further than 1m above the maximum winter water table. Since this is not what’s proposed, it is crucial to know the tolerance or error levels of the MWWT - as we agreed at the meeting.
For Radial Basis Functions "2.3 ...the error goes to zero when the data samples are getting dense", but in this case the data samples are not "dense"; far from it. Amec has essentially used 6 data points to model almost 60 acres. If the error or level of tolerance is +/- 1m or more, this could have a dramatic bearing on the working method employed.
In response, writing to us in February the following year, the person responsible for the EA’s technical position on Straitgate weighed in to defend the cement conglomerate and its silent consultants:
Your email questions [sic] the term 'exact interpolator'. Exact interpolator here means that the modelled surface will use the values measured at the piezometers. These will not be changed by the interpolation method. The values in between the points for which values are known will of course have to be interpolated, as is the nature of interpolation. It is not possible to drill boreholes at every point across this quarry (or any other). Therefore it is not possible to know, everywhere, what the difference is between the modelled surface and actual groundwater levels. Interpolation and contouring are very commonly used methods in hydrogeology and geology. They are used because it is not possible to see the groundwater surface or underlying geology. Therefore the best that can be done is to obtain information at set points (boreholes) and interpolate between them. We are satisfied that this addresses the issue of 'tolerance levels'.
But clearly that reply didn’t address, or even understand, the issue of 'tolerance levels', and later that month the EA were persuaded as much, and wrote to DCC again:
...the Straitgate Action Group has highlighted to us the incompleteness of the response provided by Aggregate Industries (via AMEC) to our letter of 18 September 2017 with regard to them providing a 'description of tolerance levels'... Section 2.1 of AMEC’s response makes no reference to tolerance levels, the relevance of tolerance levels, or the level of accuracy in the interpolated maximum winter water table (MWWT). We recommend that a description of tolerance levels is therefore requested again from the applicant to support the planning application and to provide clarity in advance of the Planning Committee.
In March 2018, a response was finally provided by Aggregate Industries’ consultants (Amec Foster Wheeler, previously AMEC, now Wood). Now – at the end of 2019, and only through a Freedom of Information request – that response has finally been provided to us. Unfortunately, however, Aggregate Industries and its consultants still haven't come clean on the accuracy of their prediction. Surprised?

Perhaps they were unsure what 'tolerance' meant. AFW said:
We assume that in this context tolerance is used to mean an allowable amount of variation of a specified quantity (for example in the dimensions of a machine or part) or the level of "uncertainly" around the MWWT.
for which they obviously needed help from a dictionary:


But here’s the thing: Aggregate Industries’ consultants do accept that the MWWT contours are not accurate. We’ll say that again for anyone drifting off at this point: Aggregate Industries’ consultants accept that the MWWT contours are not accurate:
...the MWWT grid is faithful to the actual water levels measured at the piezometers which existed on the site when the historically high levels of winter 2013/14 were experienced. Therefore, at these locations the uncertainty is zero and the grid is accurate to the measured data.
At all other locations – i.e. virtually the whole 55-acre site where there is not one of the 6 piezometers – we can therefore infer that the uncertainty is not zero. Hallelujah. Are we getting somewhere now? The question is, if the uncertainty is not zero, what is the scale of the uncertainty, and how does it vary across the site? Uncertainties will be less in locations close to piezometers, and greater further away. Here are the locations of the 6 piezometers used in 2015, and the MWWT contours interpolated from the maximum groundwater levels recorded by them:



But if the uncertainty is not zero, why have Aggregate Industries’ consultants not built a margin of error, a margin of safety into the company's prediction of the MWWT contours, the base of any quarry? Oh, but we have, AFW argued:
As the MWWT was subsequently based on the higher of the two interpolated surfaces (i.e. Radial Basis interpolation) this could be considered to represent the upper limit of interpretation, with the Kriging interpolation representing the lower limit of interpretation and therefore the difference between these two realistic grids could be considered as reflection of the ‘tolerance’.
However, even AFW doesn't sound convinced: it could be considered a reflection. Really? Is that the best they can come up with? Aggregate Industries’ consultants are no doubt clever people. They will know the reasoning behind that statement is flawed. They will know that just because radial basis interpolation has resulted in a slightly higher surface than kriging for these 6 points, does not mean it is accurate. Likewise, they will know that there is no mathematical textbook that says the lower limit of interpretation of radial basis can be determined by kriging. The argument is hokum.

All AFW was attempting to do was to obfuscate, to confuse, to muddle the EA. All AFW was doing was showing the difference between how two techniques (kriging and radial basis) have interpolated 6 measurements to predict groundwater levels across 55 sloping acres. All AFW was showing was the difference between one inaccurate model and another inaccurate model. This is not a tolerance, it is a difference.

What AFW has NOT done, for very obvious reasons, is to consider – at least in public, for the benefit of locals, the Council and the EA alike – the inherent inaccuracies of each of those techniques.

And there will be interpolation errors in both radial basis and kriging. Our email to the EA above looked at radial basis, and the fact that the error only goes to zero when the data samples are getting dense. But Aggregate Industries’ consultants also claim to have employed kriging. They will therefore know that kriging comes with an advantage, an advantage widely known about. Here are four sources – all saying much the same thing:
For example:
The figure below, created in 3D analyst, illustrates variation in kriging predictions, showing the range of prediction error (sticks) over kriging predictions (surface). A stick’s color changes according to the prediction error value. As a rule, prediction errors are larger in areas with a small number of samples.


So why, given that Aggregate Industries’ consultants would have known the scale of the potential errors across the site, did they chose not to provide this information to the EA when asked? Why instead, did they chose to mislead, by just comparing the results of two different modelling methods? What are we to infer? That the kriging errors are of such a magnitude to make the MWWT contours look absurd?

But there’s more. Modelling – despite the impression given by Aggregate Industries’ consultants – is not an exact science. For kriging:
Because the output is a geostatistical layer, it’s dynamic, meaning you can change its output type as prediction, errors of prediction, probability or quantile. Or you can even go back into the geostatistical layer and change the parameters if you don’t like the optimized output.
Is "change the parameters if you don’t like the optimized output" ringing any warning bells?

In other words, not only would Aggregate Industries’ consultants have seen where their predictions were poor, they would have also produced a variety of interpolated surfaces with a range of different predictions. And yet what do we have? We have supposedly bright people quoting differences between one guesstimated surface and another guesstimated surface to cm precision, e.g.
the largest positive value (at the northeast boundary of the extraction area) is 0.08m
This is clearly nonsense. Beyond the locations of the piezometers, these models can hardly predict reality to the nearest metre, let alone cm. And of course, to prove this, in 2018 the MWWT failed in four locations, by almost 1.6 m in one location and almost 1.3 m in another.

Has the EA been persuaded by the arguments put forward by Aggregate Industries’ consultants, following their earlier (mis)understanding of tolerances? It would appear so. In an email from the EA in June 2018:
We have reviewed the document and we are satisfied that it answers our questions about the derivation of the Maximum Winter Water Table grid.
However, the EA has been spurred into calling for daily groundwater monitoring – not weekly as previously suggested by Aggregate Industries. The EA has also now requested:
that groundwater levels in the piezometers constructed in 2016 and 2017 are estimated for the 'high water table' period in 2013/14. This 'hindcasting' will provide an indication of groundwater levels in these piezometers prior to their construction and improve confidence in the MWWT grid in this area of the proposed quarry. Correlation of the contemporaneous datasets from 2016 to the present should assist in this process.
Can anybody trust Aggregate Industries’ consultants to do that properly – based on their reluctance to come clean on tolerance levels? Any upwards movement of the MWWT loses sand and gravel resource – aka profit – for its client. As far as Aggregate Industries is concerned:
AIUK would be willing to do this if permission is granted.
In other words, after determination, away from prying eyes. We shouldn't be surprised by Aggregate Industries' attitude anymore, not after AI put a stop to public scrutiny of groundwater data for Straitgate application.

In summary, it's simple: To allow for the uncertainty in Aggregate Industries' predictions, an unquarried buffer should remain above the guesstimated MWWT. Prof Brassington argued "an unquarried buffer of at least 3 m is left above the maximum water table to minimise the negative impacts."

EA admits it may have made Dawlish sea defences worse

Plainly the Environment Agency is not immune from making mistakes, not immune from being taken in by optimistic prediction models:


Martin Davies, from the EA, said: "There weren't mistakes. The design was based on predictions which obviously we've established were incorrect."
The EA said it was legally obliged to remove the old hard flood defences, but its prediction models did not reflect the strength of recent winter storms.

Decision on Hertfordshire quarry stalls due to EA no-show

A proposal to quarry 8 million tonnes of sand and gravel in Hertfordshire has raised concerns that a bromate plume attributed to a leak from a former chemical works could be disturbed and pollute drinking water supplies. A decision on the quarry proposal was expected to be taken at a planning meeting last month, but was deferred after Environment Agency representatives failed to attend:


The Environment Agency have said that the proposed operations - and the required planning requirements - would "reduce and effectively manage the risk".
But the county council's development control committee refused to take a decision without further information from the Environment Agency.
Leading calls for the deferment, county councillor Seamus Quilty said the decision was a "balancing act" - and that it was "an absolute disgrace" that the Environment Agency was not present.
He said the EA's references to reducing and managing the risk meant that there was a risk and asked the watchdog to give a professional guarantee that there would be no contamination to the public water supply.
"Not having them here is ridiculous," said Conservative councillor Quilty. 

Monday, 6 January 2020

Brazil dam disaster – report on causes released

We have previously posted about the collapse of a mining tailings dam in Brazil, most recently how police have proposed criminal charges against mining giant Vale – the world's largest iron ore producer – and German safety firm Tüv Süd.

A report on the cause of the disaster by a panel of experts appointed by the company’s lawyers has now been released:
A company-commissioned study released Thursday on a deadly dam break in Brazil found that none of the structure’s monitoring systems gave warning of the collapse that killed at least 257 people — though other experts have said the disaster could have been prevented.


Others talk about a tale of negligence and cover-up:




The dangers from tailing dams are not limited to Vale:


Construction output falls again


The headline seasonally adjusted IHS Markit/CIPS UK Construction Total Activity Index scored 44.4 in December, down from 45.3 in November, and below the crucial 50.0 no-change value for an eighth consecutive month.
December’s PMI survey revealed an industry still largely flat on its back. The fall in activity has yet to bottom out; eight straight months in negative territory is an unwanted honour not seen since the dark days of a decade ago.

The environmental cost of sand

The environmental impact of concrete is not limited to climate change:
In 2016, world cement production generated around 2.2 billion tonnes of CO2 - equivalent to 8% of the global total
Mining the sand and gravel needed for concrete has devastating effects too:


Increasing demand for the world’s most-used natural material, sand, is fuelling mining in fragile natural habitats and prompting a growing number of countries to ban exports.
The construction industry’s use of sand, gravel and crushed rock outstrips total global consumption of all fossil fuels and metals combined, when measured by weight, according to the OECD.
The sheer scale of sand and gravel extraction is creating what the UN Environment Programme has called "one of the major sustainability challenges of the 21st century".
"The amount of infrastructure coming down the pipeline for urbanisation is so gargantuan that unless there are sustainable solutions . . . [sand mining is] going to have more and more of an impact on our rivers and coastlines," said Richard Lee from conservation organisation WWF.
Here's just one example:


A crisis is engulfing the Mekong River, its banks are collapsing and half a million people are at risk of losing their homes.
"Extraction is happening at absolutely astronomical rates, we're having an industrial-scale transformation of the shape of the planet," says river scientist Prof Stephen Darby at Southampton University.
His studies on the lower Mekong show its bed has been lowered by several metres in just a few years, over many hundreds of kilometres, all in the quest for sand.

What climate change means